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Introduction
The sudden popularity of social networks and web 2.0 applications changed radically the 
Internet landscape and the users’ behavior. Today’s young people are the first generation 
with the ability to distribute information quickly, cheaply and to large groups of people. 
The amount  of  personal  and private  information  published and stored  in  the  servers 
becomes so huge that the traditional  concepts of privacy were radically affected.  To 
appease such  concerns,  enterprises and service  providers  publish  privacy  statements 
that promise fair information practices. Written in natural language or formalized using 
languages  like  P3P  [1],  EPAL  [2],  XACML  [3]  etc…  they  are  only  promises  but  not 
necessarily enforced by technical measures.  These problems are amplified if personal 
data is used not only by the enterprise that collected the data, but also by secondary 
users such as partner organizations, or government agencies. These flows of data are 
complex.  Threats to data privacy can come from inside (accidental  disclosure,  insider 
curiosity and subornation) as well as from the outside (uncontrolled secondary usage) of 
each  organization.  Putting  customer  information  online  further  increases  the  risk  of 
exposing private and sensitive information to outsiders. In this paper we propose a new 
policy language handling access control and data usage at the same time. In the context 
of the European ICT PrimeLife1 we propose an extension of the eXtensible access control 
markup  language  (XACML  3.0)  offering  one  of  the  most  popular  standardized  policy 
language.  This  extension  suggests  a  new obligation  handling  mechanism taking  into 
account  temporal  constraints,  pre-obligations,  conditional  obligations,  and  repeating 
obligations together with a down-stream usage authorization system defining the access 
control rules under which personal information collected by an entity can be forwarded to 
a third party. Moreover, our language is based on the concept of trusted credentials. 
1 http://www.primelife.eu/ 
PrimeLife Policy Language
As  mentioned  previously  we  extend  XACML  3.0  with  data  handling  and  credential 
capabilities. We maintain the overall structure of the XACML language, but we introduce a 
number of new elements to support the advanced features that our language has to offer, 
and  we also  modify  the  schema of  a  number  of  existing  elements.  Our  language  is 
intended to  be used by the Data Controller2 to specify the access restrictions  to the 
resources  that  he  offers;  by  the  Data  Subject3 to  specify  access  restrictions  to  her 
personal  information,  and how she wants  her  information  to  be  treated by  the  Data 
Controller  afterwards;  by  the  Data  Controller  to  specify  how  “implicitly”  collected 
personal information (such as IP address, connection time, etc.) will be treated; and by 
the  Data Subject  to  specify  how it  wants  this  implicit  information  to be treated.  The 
following sections describes how XACML is extended, what are the new elements that we 
propose, and why is it essential to add such extensions.
a. Rules, policies, and policy sets
As in XACML, the main components of our language are rules, policies, and policy sets. 
Each rule has an effect, either “Permit” or “Deny”, that indicates the consequence when 
all  conditions  stated  in  the  rule  have  been  satisfied.  Rules  are  grouped  together  in 
policies. When a policy is evaluated, the rule combining algorithm of the policy (as stated 
in an XML attribute  of  the policy)  defines how the effects of  the applicable rules are 
combined to determine the effect of the policy. The main components of a rule are a 
target, describing the resource, the subject, and the environment variables for which this 
rule is applicable;  credential  requirements,  describing the credentials that need to be 
presented in order to be granted access to the resource; provisional actions, describing 
which actions have to be performed by the requestor in order to be granted access; a 
condition,  specifying  further  restrictions  on the  applicability  of  the  rule  beyond those 
specified in the target and the credential requirements; data handling policies, describing 
how  the  information  that  needs  to  be  revealed  to  satisfy  this  rule  will  be  treated 
afterwards; and data handling preferences, describing how the information contained in 
the resource that is protected by this rule has to be treated.
b.Obligations
i. Introduction to Obligations
We define an obligation as: “A promise made by a data controller to a data subject in 
relation to the handling of his/her personal data. The data controller is expected to fulfill 
the promise by executing and/or preventing a specific action after a particular event, e.g. 
time, and optionally under certain conditions". Obligations play an important role in daily 
business. Most companies collect personally identifiable information (personal data) on 
customers and employ ad-hoc mechanisms to keep track of associated authorizations 
and  obligations.  State  of  the  art  mechanisms  to  handle  collected  personal  data  in 
accordance with to a privacy policy are lacking expressiveness and/or support for cross-
domain definition of obligations.
2 A Data Controller is an entity that alone or jointly with others determines the purposes 
and means of the processing of personal data. The processing of personal data may be 
carried out by a Data Processor acting on behalf of the Data Controller.
3 A Data Subject is the person whose personal data are collected, held or processed by 
the Data Controller.
ii. Why should we define an Obligation Language?
Most of the available policy languages, like XACML [3], EPAL [2], Ponder [4], Rei [5] and 
PRIME-DHP [1],  provide either only a placeholder or very limited obligation capability. 
Moreover these languages do not provide any concrete model for obligation specification. 
The work proposed in this paper incorporates some of the prior art and extends it toward 
more expressiveness, extensibility, and interoperability. We identify four main challenges 
related to obligations:
• Service providers must avoid committing to obligations that cannot be enforced. 
For instance, it is not straightforward to delete data when backup copies do exist. 
Tools to detect inconsistencies are necessary. 
• Services should offer a way to take user's preferences4 into account. Preferences 
may be expressed by ticking check boxes, by a full policy, or even be provided by 
a  trusted  third  party.  Mechanisms  to  match  user's  privacy  preferences  and 
service's privacy policies are necessary. 
• Services  need  a  way  to  communicate  acceptable  obligations  to  users,  to  link 
obligations and personal data, and to enforce obligations.
• Finally, users need a way to evaluate the trustworthiness of service providers, i.e. 
know whether the obligation will indeed be enforced. This could be achieved by 
assuming  that  misbehavior  impacts  reputation,  by  audit  and  certification 
mechanisms, and/or by relying on trusted computing.
c. Definition of an Obligation Language
An obligation is often defined as Event-Condition-Action [4] 
On Event If Condition Do Action  
For facilitating the comparison of obligations, we consider triggers as events filtered by 
conditions. In other words, we replace the notions of events and conditions by trigger. 
The triggers are events related to an obligation. These events result in actions that are 
executed according to the obligation’s  requirements.  Additionally,  in order to simplify 
obligations management, we specify a validity period for each obligation:
Do Action when Trigger (from Start to End)
We use a common language for expressing obligations in data controller’s privacy policy, 
in data subject’s privacy preferences, and in sticky policies.
• Data subject’s  privacy preferences specify  “required obligations”,  i.e.  what  the 
data subject requires in terms of obligation to provide a given piece of personal 
data to a given data controller. 
• Data controller’s privacy policy specifies “proposed obligations”, i.e. what the data 
controller  is  willing  (and  able)  to  enforce  in  terms  of  obligation  for  a  given 
collected data. 
Sticky policy specifies “committed obligations”, i.e. the obligations data subject and data 
controller agreed upon and that must be enforced by the data controller.
4 The expectation of a data subject in terms of how his or her personal data should be 
handled.
d.Specifying Authorizations
Data handling policies,  preferences, and sticky policies contain,  apart  from the set of 
obligations described above, also a set of authorizations. While obligations specify actions 
that  the  Data  Controller  is  required  to  perform  on  the  transmitted  information, 
authorizations specify actions that it is allowed to perform. Similarly to what we did for 
obligations,  we  recognize  that  it  is  impossible  to  define  an  exhaustive  list  of 
authorizations that covers all  needs that may ever arise in the real world. Rather, we 
define  a  generic,  user-extensible  structure  for  authorizations  so  that  new,  possibly 
industry-specific  authorization  vocabularies  can  be  added  later  on.  We  do  provide 
however a basic  authorization vocabulary  for  using data for  certain purposes and for 
downstream access control, and we describe how these authorizations can be efficiently 
matched via a general strategy.
i. Authorization Purposes 
The  first  concrete  authorization  type  that  we  define  is  the  authorization  to  use 
information for a particular set of purposes. Purposes are referred to by standard URIs 
specified in agreed-upon vocabularies of usage purposes. These vocabularies of URIs may 
be organized as flat lists or as hierarchical ontologies. 
ii. Authorization for downstream usage
The second concrete authorization type that we define is the authorization to forward the 
information  to  third  parties,  so-called  downstream  data  controllers.  Optionally,  this 
authorization enables the data subject to specify the access control policy under which 
the information will be made available, i.e., the minimal access control policy that the 
(primary) data controller has to enforce when sharing the information with downstream 
data controllers.
e. Credential requirements
The policy language that we present is geared towards enabling technology-independent 
user-centric and privacy-friendly access control on the basis of certified credentials. By a 
credential  we  mean  an  authenticated  statement  about  attribute  values  made  by  an 
Issuer,  where the  statement  is  independent  from a concrete mechanism for  ensuring 
authenticity.  The  statement  made  by  the  issuer  is  meant  to  affirm  qualification.  As 
credentials are not directly supported in the traditional policy languages, we extended 
the XACML Rule element such that credentials are the basic unit for reasoning about 
access control. In our language each rule can contain a Credential Requirements element 
to specify the credentials that have to be presented in order to satisfy the rule.  This 
element contains  a separate Credential  element for  each credential  that  needs to be 
presented. The Credential element can contain restrictions that apply to the credential. 
f. Provisional actions
A Provisional Action element is used to specify the provisional actions that a requestor 
must perform before being granted access to the resource. Currently supported actions 
include  revealing  of  attributes  (to  the  Data  Controller  or  to  a  third  party),  signing  a 
statement, and so-called “spending” of credentials, which allows to put restrictions on the 
number of times that the same credential is used to obtain access. 
g.Data handling policies
Each rule, policy, or policy set can contain a number of data handling policies, each of 
which is expressed within a Data Handling Policy element. A data handling policy can be 
referred to from anywhere in the rule by its unique Policy identifier. The main purpose of 
the data handling policies is for the Data Controller to express what will happen to the 
information  about  the  Data  Subject  that  is  collected  during  an  access  request.  The 
provisional action to reveal an attribute value therefore contains an optional reference to 
the  applicable  data  handling  policy.  A  data  handling  policy  consists  of  a  set  of 
authorizations (described in section 3) that the Data Controller wants to obtain on the 
collected information, and a set of obligations (described in section 2) that he promises to 
adhere  to.  Before  the  Data Subject  reveals  her  information,  these authorizations  and 
obligations  are matched against  the Data Subject’s  data handling preferences to  see 
whether a matching sticky policy can be agreed upon.
h.Data handling preferences
The data handling preferences of a rule specify how the information obtained from the 
resource protected by this rule is to be treated after access is granted. The preferences 
are expressed by means of a set of authorizations and obligations, just like data handling 
policies. When access to the resource is requested, the data handling preferences have to 
be matched against a proposed data handling policy to derive the applicable sticky policy 
– if a match can be found. An important difference between data handling preferences 
and data handling policies is the resource that they pertain to: data handling preferences 
always describe how the resource protected by the rule itself has to be treated, while 
data handling policies pertain to information that a requester will have to reveal in order 
to be granted access to the resource. The main use of data handling preferences that we 
envisage is for a Data Subject to specify how she wants her personal data to be treated 
by a Data Controller, i.e.,  which authorizations she grants to the Data Controller with 
respect to her personal data, and which obligations he will have to adhere to.
i. Sticky policies
The  sticky  policy  associated  to  a  resource,  is  the  agreed-upon  sets  of  granted 
authorizations and promised obligations with respect to a resource. The sticky policy is 
usually the result of an automated matching procedure between the Data Subject’s data 
handling preferences and the Data Controller’s data handling policy. The main difference 
between a sticky policy and data handling preferences is that the former contains the 
authorizations and obligations that the policy-hosting entity itself has to adhere to, while 
the latter contains authorizations and obligations that an eventual recipient has to adhere 
to. 
Conclusion
In this paper we provide an overview about the different extensions that we propose to 
add to the standardized policy language XACML in order to enhance its privacy protection 
capabilities.  These  improvements  correspond  to  the  privacy  protection  requirements 
addressed in the PrimeLife project.
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